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COLLATERAL, RATIONING, AND GOVERNMENTINTERVENTION IN CREDIT MARKETS
ABSTRAfl
This paper analyzes the effects of government intervention in credit
markets when lenders use collateral, interest, and the probability of
granting a loan as potential screening devices.Equilibria with and without
rationing are examined.The principal theme is that credit policies operate
through their effect on the incentive compatibility constraint, which
inhibits high-risk borrowers from mimicking the behavior of low-risk
borrowers.Any policy that loosens (tightens) the constraint raises
(reduces) efficiency.
Most government credit programs explicitly attempt to fund investors
that cannot obtain private financing.In the model presented here, these
subsidies increase the extent of rationing and reduce efficiency.In
contrast, policies that subsidize the nonrationed borrowers, or all
borrowers, are efficiency enhancing, and reduce the extent of rationing.
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Department of Economics
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1.Introduction
The federal government is the largest single lender in the country.As
of the end of 1988, direct loans outstanding exceeded $222 billion, while
outstanding loan guarantees were approximately $550 billion (Office of Man-
agement and Budget 1989) .Federalcredit assists borrowers across a wide
variety of sectors, including housing, agriculture, small business, and
education, in a bewildering array of over 100 programs)
In order to analyze the effects of these policies, this paper focuses
on two salient characteristics of virtually all credit programs.First,
federal credit is usually intended for those who could not obtain private
financing.For example, "a direct loan is best justified when the federal
objective could not be met with financing from private sources(Office of
Management and Budget, 1988, p. F-15).Other programs, such as Small
Business Administration loan guarantees, reauire applicants to prove that
they could not obtain private financing.
Second, federal credit is provided on easier terms than comparable
private credit.These terms can include reduced interest or collateral,
longer maturities, grace periods, etc.These provisions are estimated to
reduce the discounted value of borrower payments by amounts that vary widely
across programs, but typically range between 10% and 25% (Office of
Management and Budget 1989).
This paper analyzes the effects of policies with these characteristics
in a model where rationing arises endogenously.2The underlying model is2
described in Section 2 and is closely related to Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) and Besanko and Thakor (1987).Investors are divided into two
groups, high-risk and low-risk, and have a choice of investing in a safe
project, or borrowing to invest in a risky project.For each group, lenders
specify a probability of issuing a loan, an interest rate, and a collateral
requirement.
Any given amount of collateral is assumed to be worth less to lenders
than to borrowers.This feature implies that the use of collateral will
generate an efficiency loss.In addition, all projects have expected gross
returns greater than their social opportunity cost.Therefore, any amount
of rationing represents an additional efficiency loss.The full information
equilibrium arises when borrower type is known ex ante, and implies no
rationing and no collateral, and is thus efficient.
Section 3 analyzes situations where each borrower's type is private
information.Now, lenders must collectively offer sets of contracts that
induce borrowers to self-select into the appropriate contract.In equilib-
rium, high-risks choose a contract with a relatively high interest rate and
a zero collateral requirement.Low-risks signal their type by choosing to
pay high collateral in exchange for a lower interest rate.As long as low-
risks have sufficient wealth to post as collateral, the equilibrium involves
no rationing.Nevertheless, because of the efficiency loss created by the
use of collateral, there is a potential role for government.
The principal result of this section is to show that credit policies
operate through their effects on the incentive compatibility constraint,
which constrains the set of adinissable contracts such that high-risk
borrowers do not apply for the low-risk contract.For example, a guarantee
to low-risk borrowers reduces their interest rate.Since the high-risk3
contract has not changed, the low-risk collateral requirement must xi.ain
order to restore incentive compatibility.The increase in collateral means
that guarantees to low-risks reduce efficiency.
In contrast, a guarantee to high-risk borrowers makes the high-risk
loan more attractive, thereby allowing lenders to reduce the collateral
requirement on low-risk loans.Consequently, guarantees to high-risks raise
efficiency.Equal guarantees to both groups have similar negative effects
on the collateral requirement and positive effects on efficiency.
The major results of the paper are presented in Section 4, where it is
assumed that borrower wealth is too low to support the collateral require-
ment in Section 3.Because the high-risk contract involves no collateral,
it does not change.However, since low-risks can only post a small amount
of collateral, the low-risk contract must somehow be made less desirable in
order to restore incentive compatibility.The only option is to reduce the
probability of granting a low-risk loan; that is, to introduce rationing of
low-risk borrowers
With the existence of rationing, it is now possible to analyze credit
policies with the two salient features described above.Suppose the govern-
ment agrees to offer subsidized credit (either direct or guaranteed loans)
to some proportion of the (low-risk) borrowers who are turned down by the
private market.The key point is that in the absence of any further
changes, these subsidies make the low-risk contract more attractive to high-
risk borrowers.Therefore, some other aspect of the low-risk contract must
become less desirable to restore incentive compatibility.Since the
collateral requirement cannot rise, the only alternative is for the overall
(public and private) probability of obtaining a loan to fall.That is,
increased subsidies to the rationed borrowers the extent of rationing.Private lending is crowded out on a more than one-to-one basia.It ahould
be emphasized that this is an equilibrium response, and is due to the
existence of the incentive compatibility constraint.
Although the subsidies increase the extent of rationing, they raise the
cx ante expected utility of low-risk borrowers.This occurs because the
benefits of the added cheap government loans outweigh the costs of the in-
creased probability of being rationed.Thus, subsidies to low-risks make
the representative low-risk borrower better off cx ante, but actually reduce
the utility of some low-risk borrowers cx post.Since they increase the
extent of rationing, the subsidies to low-risk borrowers reduce overall
efficiency.
In contrast, subsidies to high-risk borrowers loosen the incentive
compatibility conatraint.As a consequence, the extent of rationing of low-
risk borrowers falls and efficiency rises.
Section 5 is a short conclusion.The Appendix provides derivation of
the various equilibria and proofs of the propositions.
2.The Basic Model
A.Description
The model describes a competitive credit market with many investors,
but even more lenders.All agents are assumed to be risk-neutral, thus
eliminating any insurance role for federal credit, and there is no aggregate
risk.
Investors can invest their initial endowment in a safe project that
yields a gross return ofZ.4Alternatively, each investor can borrow $1
and invest that and the initial endowment in a risky project.Investors
fall into two categories, which differ according to the probability of5
having a risky project succeed, ir.,andthe gross return to that project
ifitis successful,R1.I assume >IT2,sothat type l's are low-
risk borrowers.Projects that do not succeed yield a gross return of zero.
The expected gross return to all projects are equal:PiRi —k,i —1,2,
wherekis a constant.Investors have a certain end-of-period endowment
W.I assume the existence of a sufficient enforcement technology such that
Wis acceptable to lenders as collateral.The proportion of borrowers that
are low-risk is given by .
Lendershave an alternative safe investment that earns p.They offer
loans characterized by an interest rate(r),a collateral requirement
(c),and a probability of issuing the loan to any particular applicant
(p).Following several authors,5 I assume there is a cost to collateraliza-
tion.Specifically, the lenders' valuation of $1 in collateral is given by
fi,0￿ $<1.Therefore, 1 -$ > 0represents the social cost of
transferring the collateral or realizing its value.Competition among
lenders generates the following zero profit condition on loans to each
group :6
p —Rr+(l-r)$c i —1,2.
Investors are assumed to be able to apply for only one loan.The expected
utility of an investor in group iapplying for a loan contract meant for
group jis
(2) —Pj(Iri(Ri_rj)*(l_Ir)cjZ) i,j —1,2.
Lenders always know the value of .Inthe full information
equilibrium described below, lenders also know each borrower's type.In the
asymmetric information equilibria, information on borrower type is
unavailable to banks on an ex ante basis.The Nash equilibrium concept is used throughout this paper.A set of
contracts is a Nash equilibrium if no contract in the set earns negative
profits, and there is no additional contract which, if offered, would make
positive profits, holding the current set of contracts fixed (Rothschild and
Stiglitz 1976)
B.Full Information Equilibrium
Although subsequent analysis will focus on markets with asymmetric
information, the full information equilibrium is presented first as a
benchmark.Because the types are identifiable cx ante, lenders face two
distinct loan markets.In each submarket, optimal contracts maximize
expected borrower utility U1,given in (2), subject to (1).
Equilibrium I:The full information equilibrium is characterized by
(3a) p —1, i —1,2, (No rationing)
(3b) c—0, i —1,2 (No collateral)
(3c) r — i—1,2,
With full information, all borrowers receive loans.In addition, since
borrowers are indifferent between committing to a dollar of expected
interest payments and a dollar of expected collateral, while lenders prefer
the former, equilibrium involves complete elimination of collateral.









I II Indifference curves(U1andU2 )andzero profit curves(Iland12)
for each group are shown in Figure 1.For each group, fiC1implies that
the isoprofit curve is flatter than the indifference curve.Curves for
high-risk borrowers are steeper than those for low-risk borrowers.The full
information equilibrium is given by contracts a anda2 along with




Sincep + Zis the social opportunity cost of investment,(4) shows that
investments are made(Uii > 0)if and only if the expected total return
exceeds the expected social cost.Therefore, equilibrium is efficient.
3,Asyinetrjc Information and Unconstrained Collateral
A.Private Equilibrium
When individual investors' types are private information, lenders must
design sets of loan contracts that generate self-selection of each borrower
type into the appropriate contract.Thus, lenders operate subject to(1)
and a pair of incentive compatibility constraints:
U11 U12,and
U22 a U21,
whereUijis defined in (2).It can be directly verified that the full
information equilibrium is not incentive compatible, because both types
would prefer the low-risk contract.r
Figure 1
Equilibrium with Unconstrained Collateral
C8
Instead, with asymmetric information, collateral is used as a sorting
device.7High-risk borrowers have a stronger preference not to post
collateral, because they have a larger probability of having to pay it.
Whether collateral can induce complete separation depends crucially on
W,the level of borrower wealth.This section examines equilibria and
government policy when borrower wealth is sufficiently large to allow
complete separation.Section 4 examines markets characterized by insuffic-
ient wealth.
Eauilibriua II:When borrower type is private information, and borrower
wealth is sufficiently large, equilibrium is characterized by:8
II II
(6a) p1—1, p2 —l
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Withimperfect information, high-risk borrowers obtain the same loan
contract, and therefore the same utility, as in the full information
equilibrium.Low-risk borrowers are not rationed, but their loan terms have
changed.Specifically, low-risk borrowers indicate their type by posting
collateral.In return, they pay a lower interest rate than in the full
information equilibrium.
Substituting (6a)-(6c) into (2) for type l's yields
II II
U11 — -p-Z -(l-r1)(l-fl)c1
Comparing (4) and (7), low-risk borrowers are worse off relative to the full
information equilibrium by(l-r1)(l-fl)c.The magnitude of the welfare9
loss increases withc1.
The equilibrium with asyimnetric information and unconstrained
collateral is shown in Figure 1 as(a1,a2).High-risks obtaina2 as
before.However, any contract offered to low-risks must be incentive
compatible witha2.Of all such contracts,a1is the most desirable
contract for type l's that also earns nonnegative profits when extended to
type l's.The reduction in low-risk borrowersutility to U from U
is shown by the shift from a toa1.Note that (5b) is binding in this
equil ibriun.
.GovernmentCredit
Although there is no rationing in the above model, there is still a
role for government policy due to the efficiency losses created by the use
of collateral.Because all investors receive loans in the private equilib-
rium, it seems natural to focus on loan guarantees (rather than direct
loans) in this context.9
Loan guarantees ensure the lender of receiving an amount -y.,where
o ￿ p.The government can set11 —12 y,or choose the
separately.In return for the guarantee, the lender passes on any collater-
al collected to the government.The net cost to the government of a
III III
defaulted loan is -flc. wherec. is the collateral requirement
in the presence of the guarantee, and is discussed further below.The
government is subject to the same information constraints that private
lenders face.
With the guarantees in place, expected borrower utility is still given
by (2), but the zero profit condition for lenders is now given by
(8) p —.ri+(]--)ii —1,2.10
Equilibrium III:When borrower type is private information andW >C111,
equilibrium with loan guarantees is characterized by:







1W 1-,r III p 1 III p 2 (9c) r —— - 1 , r —— - 1 1 r 1 2 r 2
In the preceding private Equilibrium II, banks received 9c and0in
collateral on loans to type 1 and 2 respectively.It is easy to verify that
—9cand12 —0,(9a)-(9c) reduce to the private equilibrium (Ga)-
(6c).Only higher guarantee rates have real effects.
III Using (9b)increases in11causec1 to rise in equilibrium.
This result is contrary to standard intuition, which would suggest that as
11rises, the necessary collateral should fall.However, as11rises,
r1falls, and the low-risk contract becomes more desirable to high-risk
borrowers.Since (5b) binds,c1uust rise to e1itinate the possibility of
having high-risks masquerade as low-risks.
This situation is depicted in Figure 2.Increases in11shift the
zero profit line for low-risk lending from I to
Ii.Equilibrium
contracts, which are constrained by (5a) and (5b), shift from(a1,a2)to
(aja2).The collateral required atajis greater thana1.Therefore,
the existence of imperfect information reverses the usual intuition
concerrthg the effect of11 OflC1.
Any guarantee to low risks that reduced the collateral requirement
would make them worse off and thus would be rejected in favor ofa1.This
is illustrated by a guarantee that shifts the zero profit curve to
Ii'r
Figure 2




fromIjand the low-risk contract to .Itis easy to show that all
such guarantees correspond to <
Similararguments show thatcf"falls with increases in As
shown in Figure 3,a rise in shifts the zero profit line for lending
to high-risk borrowers from12toI,which raises low-risk utility to
l3from132.The equilibrium thus shifts from(a1,a2)to(a,a).At
the latter points, kflgroupsare better off and the collateral requirement
has fallen.
Since the use of collateral creates efficiency losses, these results










Increasesin raise1Jlleven though they raisec1.For any
>scf' low-risk borrowers are better off than in the private equilib-
rium.Increases in raise both1311and 22Thus, both types of
borrowers are better off with guarantees.
Welfare calculations are based on total expected borrowers' utility





The first two terms represent utility of each borrower type, weighted by
their population proportion; the last two tens represent net expected








ProDosition 1:When borrower type is private information, andW > c,









The main result from Proposition 1 is that the effects of government
intervention depend on how the incentive compatibility constraint, and in
particular the collateral requirement, is affected.
Equation (13) states that increases inl'holding2 constant,
reduce welfare.From (10), the guarantee raisesU11by((l-ir1)(ir1-ir2))/
(l0-2))However, from (12), the marginal cost per low-risk borrower of
raisingl
is (l-ir1) .Itis easy to show that the marginal costs exceed
the marginal benefits.This occurs because the rise in raisesc1
which creates an efficiency loss.
The second result states that subsidizing the high-risk group is
welfare-improving.Using (11) arid (12), the government's costs equal the
benefits to high-risk borrowers.Since low-risk borrowers are also made
better off, there is a welfare gain.The rise in2increases the
attractiveness of the high-risk contract, so that low-risk borrowers can be
offered more attractive terms.The fall inc1allows for an efficiency
gain.13
Equation (15) states that raising the guarantee rate on all loans is
welfare-improving.From (9b), setting l — — -yyieldsc/3-y<0,
so that collateral falls as the overall guarantee rate rises.Therefore,
the net effect of universal guarantees is to weaken the incentive
compatibility constraint and raise welfare.
4.Asymmetric Information and Constrained Collatexa].
A.Private Equilibrium
The effectiveness of collateral as a sorting device depends crucially
on the existence of sufficient end-of-period borrower wealth.For example,
ifW —0,collateral cannot be used as a sorting device.More generally,
supposew< cf' given in (Gb); then the low-risk contract offered in
Equilibrium II cannot be fulfilled by borrowers.Lenders, knowing this,
will not offer the contract.Moreover, because (5b) is binding in
equilibrium, if lenders simply reducedc1toW,the contracts offered
would not be incentive compatible; both groups would prefer the contract
meant for low-risk borrowers.
Lenders can resolve this problem only by making the low-risk contract
less attractive to high-risk borrowers.11Raisingr1would discourage
low-risk borrowers more than high-risk borrowers, since the latter have a
smaller probability of actually having to pay the higher rate.The only
alternative is to reducep1.This adjustment will discourage high-risks
more, and restore incentive compatibility.Therefore, when borrower wealth
is insufficient to permit collateral alone to act as a sorting device,
rationing of low-risk borrowers(p1<l)is required to restore equilibrium.
The intuition presented above is summarized in14
Equilibrium IV:When borrower type is private information andw <41,





(1Gb) c1 W, c2—o
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High-risk borrowers receive the same contract and utility as in Equilibrium
II, whenW >cU.In contrast, because they cannot post cUin collater-
al, low-risk borrowers are rationed.Their expected utility is given by
(17) U —
B.Government Credit
In the presence of rationing, the natural government policy to analyze
is characterized byG'the probability of obtaining a government-
guaranteed loan given that one can not obtain private credit, and
defined as before.Although the analysis will focus on subsidized loan
guarantees, analogous results can be shown to hold for subsidized direct
loans as well.
The interest rate charged on guaranteed loans gives lenders zero
profits and is given by
(18) rG —
P -
It is assumed that government chargesWascollateral.14
With this policy, low-risk utility is given by15
(19) U11 — +(lPi)PXi.15
The first term on the right side of (19) represents the probability of
obtaining a private loan,G'
multiplied byX11,the expected payoff to
low-risk borrowers of obtaining a private loan meant for low-risk borrowers.
The second term represents the probability of obtaining a government-
guaranteed loan, 1lG' multiplied by XlGthe expected payoff to
low-risk borrowers from that loan.If l —$w,then —X1Gand there
is no gain to obtaining a government rather than a private loan.Ifl
>
$W,X11 >X1G.
The incentive compatibility constraint (Sb) is now given by
(20) U22 p1X21 +OPl)PGX2G
where is the expected payoff to high-risks of taking a private loan
meant for low-risks, and is the expected payoff to high-risks of
taking a government loan meant for low-risks.(These are given in the
Appendix.)
Eauilibri'n V:When borrower type is private information, andW <c,
the equilibrium with loan guarantees is characterized by
vU22pGX2G V
(21a) lX - <1,
21 2G
V V




Theseprivate loans are, of course, supplemented by government-guaranteed
loans to some low-risk borrowers described by G' rG W).High-risk
borrowers obtain the same contract and utility as in Equilibria II and IV.
Low-risk utility is given by (19) with appropriate substitutions for
andX1G.16
-
Definethe probability of low-risks obtaining any loan as
(22) p+(l-p)p
Then a proportionl-p*of low-risks will be rationed.
Proposition 2:When the initial allocation is given by EquilibriulD V,
increases in p or increase the extent of rationing (reducep*).
Proposition 2 establishes that government subsidies to borrowers who
cannot obtain private financing increases the numberof borrowers who cannot
obtain any financing, public or private.That is, private credit is crowded
out on a more than one-to-one basis.Although this result may appear
surprising, it is based on the equilibrium response of lenders to theshift
in the incentive compatibility constraint,
For example, in the equilibrium with W >c1,an increase in
raisedc1in order to restore incentive compatibility.Now, however,
collateral is constrained to equalW, which is assumed to be less thanc.
As a consequence, increases in l (which reducer1)require thatp1
fall.From (22), a reduction inp1,holding G constant, reducesp*.
Therefore, raising the guarantee rate to low-risk borrowers increasesthe
extent of rationing.
Similarly, consider a small increase inPC,holdingl
constant.
If were held constant, all borrowers would have an increasedchance of
obtaining a cheap government loan, which would induce high-risks to
masquerade as low-risks.Ifp1fell such thatp*were unchanged from
its previous level, high-risks would still prefer masquerading aslow-risks
to taking the high-risk contract.To show this, rewrite (20) as
(23) U22 p*X21 +(lp1)p(X2X21).17
Recall that this constraint is binding in Equilibrium V.If rises and
p*is held constant, (23) is violated.Therefore, in equilibrium,
incentive compatibility requiresp1to fall enough to makep*fall in
response to the rise in That is, increases in raise the extent of
rationing.
Although they increase the likelihood of any given low-risk borrower
being rationed, guarantees raise the cx post utility of those who do obtain
government credit, because of the reduced interest raterGon guaranteed
loans.The effects of these guarantees on the cx ante expected utility of
low-risk borrowers and on welfare is given in
ProDositipn 3:When the initial allocation is given by EquilibriumV,the









Equations(24a) and (24b) show that guaranteed loans raise the cx ante
expected utility of the targeted group.This occurs even though the overall
probability of obtaining a loan falls.Therefore, the targeted group
prefers to have the policy, even though fewer lower-risk borrowers obtain
credit when the subsidy is in place.18
Equations (25a) and (25b) show that, as in Proposition 1, guarantees to
low-risk borrowers reduce overall welfare.This occurs because the increase
in rationing represents an overall efficiency loss.Following the approach
taken in Section III,it is straightforward to show that guarantees to the
high-risk group reduce the extent of rationing.Intuitively, these
guarantees make the high-risk contract(U22)more attractive, and through
(21a) raise Because of the reduction in rationing, these guarantees
raise efficiency.
S.Conclus ion
This paper analyzes the effects of credit subsidies in markets
characterized by adverse selection.The principal result is that the
effects of credit subsidies depend on how eligibility is determined.
Programs that subsidize the unrationed contract will reduce the extent of
rationing and raise overall efficiency.In contrast, programs that target
borrowers who cannot obtain private financing raise the extent of rationing
and reduce efficiency.The distinction is important precisely because most
government credit is designed to provide funds to those who do not receive
private loans. In the model presented here, such policies raise the extent
of rationing and create inherent tradeoffs among members of the same target
group: fewer of them obtain any type of credit, but those that receive
government loans are better off.
Two concluding comments should be made.First, the effects described
above represent equilibrium responses.In particular, they take into
account the need to deter high-risks from pretending to be low-risks.As a
consequence of this incentive compatibility constraint, whenever the
government eases some of the terms on low-risk contracts, the others must be
adversely affected in equilibrium.19
Second, the paper has focused on a fairly standard adverse selection
model, based on Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)Numerous extensions of that
and other models have shown that the nature of equilibrium can be affected
by incentive effects (Stiglitz and Weiss 1986), project characteristics, the
set of available financial instruments (DeMeza and Webb 1987), alternative
projects (Chan and Thakor 1987), information sharing (Yotsuzuka 1987), the
shape of the production function (Milde and Riley 1988), and other
characteristics,The effects of credit policies in such alternative models
deserve further exploration.20
ENDNOTES
1.For discusstons of the features and overall effects of federal
credit, see 3osworth, Carron, and Rhyrte(1987),Gale (1988a), or Office of
Management and 3udget (1989).
2.Previous research on federal credit in markets with imperfect
information includes Mankiw (1986) and Gale (1988b)who study models with a
continuum of borrower types, and Gale (1987) and Smith and Stutzer (1988)
who examine models with two types of borrowers.The current paper is based
on Gale (1987, Appendix C).Some of the results are closely related to
independent work by Smith and Stutzer (1988)
3.As described in Section 4, raising the interest rate on the low-
risk loan cannot restore incentive compatibility, because low risks are more
averse to accepting a higher interest rate than high risks are.
4.The initial endowment could also represent a unit of labor supply,
in which case Zwould be interpretable as the value of leisure foregone by
investing.
5.See arro (1976), 3esanko and Thakor (1987), 3ester (1985), and
Wil1iaison (1987)
6.In order to focus on the role of collateral and rationing as
sorting devices, the paper focuses on separating equilibria.See notes 8
and 13 for a discussion of potential pooling equilibria.
7.3esanko and Thakor (1987), 3ester (1985), Chart and Thakor (1987),
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1986) and Wette (1983) analyze the selection
effects induced by collateral.
8.The existence of a separating equilibrium can be ensured by
assuming there is a sufficiently large proportion of high-risk borrowers, or
that the difference between l
-2
is large enough.See Rothschild and21
Stiglitz (1976) or Besanko and Thakor (1987).There are no pooling
equilibria under the assumptions in this section.
9.Gale (1987) also examines government policies in which low-risk
loans are taxed and high risk loans are subsidized.These policies operate
through the same channels as guarantees and will be ignored here.
10.Therefore, the welfare criterion is total surplus, rather than a
Pareto measure.In addition, (12) assumes that taxes are raised in a lump-
sum manner.
11.It is impossible to make the high-risk contract more attractive to
high-risk borrowers without losing money on high-risk contracts.Due to the
Nash assumption, cross-subsidization of contracts will not occur in this
model, although it could in other contexts.See Stiglitz and Weiss 1989.
12.Besanko and Thakor (1987) show that under these circumstances (Sa)
requires thatW Zp (if1-if2)/(if1Or2R-p) -Z1r2((l-1r1)+flif1J).Loosely
speaking, this requires thatZis small relative toW.
13.In order to rule out a pooling equilibrium atp. —1,ci —W, it
is necessary to assume that fiC(,r*(1-ir1))/(ir1(l,r*)),where,r* — +
(l*)1r2.It may be thought that the allocation in Equilibrium V could be
broken by an offer that raisesp1andr1,holdingc1atW.Such an
offer would earn positive profits if it attracted only low-risks.However,
from (2),dr/dp —(k-c-Z)/pir-(r-c)/p.Since this expression is
decreasing in it,anyoffer that raisedp1andr1relative to
Equilibrium V would attract both types and thus would not be offered.
14.Reducing the collateral requirement on government loans has the
same qualitative effects as raising p or
15.In order to avoid the prospect of borrowers turning dotn private
loans to accept public ones,I assume > PX1.22
APPENDIX
Equilibrium I:In each submarket, equilibrium contracts maximize expected
borrower utility, given in (2), subject to (1).Substitution of (1)







so that —0,which implies through (1) that 4— p/nj.In addition,
—
whichis positive if type iinvestors are applying for loans, implying
I
that —
EquilibriumII:The remaining equilibria follow a common pattern.
Therefore, Equilibrium II is derived in some detail, while the derivations
of Equilibria Ill-V are shorter.
With asymmetric information, equilibrium is obtained by maximizing the
population-weighted average of borrowers' expected utility, given by
+
subjectto (1),(5a) and (Sb).Following Besanko and Thakor (1987), the
strategy employed is initially to ignore (5a) and assume —1.Later it
will be shown that the optimal solution does satisfy (Sa) and p —1.










where Aisthe LaGrange multiplier associated with (Sb).Settingp. —1
and setting 3L/3c1 —0implies
*(lxl) (fi)xl
(A-3) A— >0, ir1(lir2) x2x1
which implies that (Sb) is binding.Using (A-3), it is easy to show that
3L/3c2 <0,which implies c — 0.Substituting for c in (Sb) and
solving (Sb) forc1yields the expression in (6b) .Givenc. ri can
be found using (1).
It remains to be shown that (Sa) is satisfied at the solution presented





Using (1) and (Gb) and some algebra, it can be shown that (A-4) holds for
the values given in Proposition II.U11 > 1312can also be seen by
examining Figure 1.





?l(2)2(l_l)ii -Ai,rR •—p- c-z 22l l
1
This can be shown to be positive provided thatk -r1 -Z>0.This
condition captures the idea that high-risks have a highr aversion to post-
ing collateral because they have a larger probability of having to pay it.
That is, the same condition implies, from (2), thatdc/dprises with ir.
Eauilibri.um III:Guaranteesshift the zero profit condition to (8) from
(1).Other-wise, the maximization follows as in Equilibrium II.That is,
substitute (8) into (2) into (A-l) and maximize subject to (5a), ignoring










Setting8LIH/8c1—0implies thatA >0,which implies that (Sb) binds.
GivenA >0,it is easy to show thatcU—0.Solving (Sb) for cH
yields the expression in (9b).Showing that (5a) is satisfied and that
p111—1follow in the same way as in Equilibrium II.
Proposition 1:Expected borrower utilities are given in (10) and (11).The
government cost of providing guarantee is(l•?)(-Y$c')for each
borrower in group i.The effects of raisingl
only or2
only are25
described in the text.The effects of raising -yare as follows.
If -ycscft,the only effect of raising -yoccurs through raising
so the increase iniis welfare improving.When -y scft,further
increases introduce opposing welfare effects.However, the net effect is
always welfare-improving.Note that, for each high-risk borrower, the
benefits of raising yequal(l-w2)&y2,which equals the cost of
providing guarantees per high-risk borrowers.The welfare effects thus





Therefore, increases in -yare welfare-improving.
EquilibriumIV:The problem is now to maximize (A-2) subject to (1),(5b)
and a wealth constraintW <c.As before, taking derivatives with
respect toc2andp2yields p —1and c —0,and the latter
result implies r —p1w2.The wealth constraint implies that cf'—
Thezero profits condition determinesrf'.Onlyp1remains to be
determined.Optimizing with respect top1implies thatA >0so that
(Sb) is binding.Solving (Sb) forp1yields the expression in (16a)
Equilibrium V:The problem is now to maximize (A-2) subject to (1) ,(Sa)
W < c, and (20), and whereU11is given by (19).Values for4,4,
4, 4,
and4
asderived as in Equilibrium IV.The equilibriump1is
determined by solving (20) forp1.
Proposition 2:Note that —x2R2 -x2p/ic1 -(w1(l-w2)-w2(l-111)fi/w1)W -
Z,and X2G — + (w2(l-w1)/w1)(-y1-$W),where these terms are derived by
substituting forrusing (1) and (18). andX1Gare derived26
analogously.From (22)
—l —pG21)22X21)
< 37 37 2
2lG 2&




using (21a) and some algebra.









using (21a).The expression in brackets can be showntobe positive, so







because the term in brackets can be shown to be positive.
To show the welfare effects of changingl'
note that the expression
in (A-6) is less than(ll) ,themarginal costs of raisingl perlow-
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